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Judicial Incentives:
Some Evidence from Urban Trial Courts

GREG

A.

CALDEIRA

That the trial judge is one of the key actors in the administration of
justice, civil and criminal, in the United States is surely a proposition that
no one can controvert. In the federal judicial system, for example, the
Supreme Court is highly dependent upon U.S. District Judges for the
implementation of its legal policies; most of the civil and criminal litigation
in the federal system begins and ends in the federal district courts.' In state
and local judicial systems, evidence suggests that almost all litigation
terminates in a trial court; few cases are appealed to higher courts. 2 Because
opinions of federal and state appellate courts are rarely unambiguous, the
trial judge has an enormous amount of discretion - and therefore power in the processing and deciding of specific cases. 3 Even when the public
policies of appellate jurisdictions are relatively clear, however, the trial judge
can evade these mandates through the use of an arsenal of available
strategies and tactics.' In his own territory, the courtroom, the trial judge's
definition of the situation is rarely challenged. Most vivid, of course, is his
power to sanction, in a wide variety of ways, the litigants before the court. 5
And the sanctioning power is never more awesome than when the trial
judge passes sentence on a convicted criminal. For the most part, the
members of the trial courtroom - prosecutors, defense attorneys, bailiffs,
clerks, defendants, police, probation officers - are dependent upon the good
will of the judge for immediate outcomes or continued effectiveness. 6 In U.S.
District Courts, for example, the U.S. Attorney and his staff are quite
dependent upon the continuing support of the trial judge; as one judge put
it, "I'm in a good position. The U.S. Attorney wants plenty from me, and I
don't want anything from him."7 There are, of course, courtrooms in which
the prosecutor dominates (e.g., the plea bargaining process); but regardless of
who dominates the processes of the court, the trial judge almost always has
the option of imposing his will on the other members of the "courtroom
team".8 Even in prosecutor-dominated judicial processes, actors seem to
anticipate the reactions of the trial judge to outcomes clearly outside the
"rules of the game". Depending upon jurisdiction, the trial judge can
exercise despotic control over juries - via either formal or informal means.
Through a well-placed incredulous facial expression during testimony or a

turning up of the eyebrow at a crucial point of his charge to the jury, the
shrewd trial judge can exercise an enormous, if not determinative, influence
over the jury's verdict.
Lawyers and social scientists interested in the intersections of law and
society, one might assume, would be quick to study an actor of such
obvious importance. If the point is obvious, however, most have missed it.
Scholars of law and society, perhaps influenced by what Jerome Frank
dubbed the "upper court myth", have, until relatively recently, systematically
ignored the roles of the trial judge in the political system. 9 In a recent essay,
Shapiro quite appropriately observed that "the discovery of trial courts by
political science came only in the 1960's. It came partially from the urban
politics specialists who, beginning from a genuine political science or public
policy perspective, saw criminal law as a major and obvious facet of local
governance." 10 What then, do we know about trial judges?
Thus far, there have been four main foci in research on trial judges.
First, several political scientists have considered the role of trial judges in
the local political system. In their analysis of New York city politics, for
example, Sayre and Kaufman emphasize the important role that trial judges
play in the urban political process. "Like all other governmental officials
and employees engaged in the quest for the stakes of political contest, judges
and their staffs are both claimants and distributors." 1 2 Judges are
"distributors" of patronage, interpreters of the "rules of the game", and
"umpires" between the other political contestants. But trial judges also share
in the rewards of urban politics. Inside and outside the courtroom, lawyers,
other political contestants, and persons in any social gathering defer to
them. While the work can be taxing, the conditions are relatively pleasant;
chances for advancement are good; compared to other public officials,
salaries and pensions are quite lucrative; and, finally, there is a high degree
of independence and security. Dolbeare examined the impact of trial judges
on urban public policy in his study of law and politics in a New York
county, and found that, of six fields of public policy, judges played
politically consequential roles in taxation, licensing, governmental powers
and procedures, and zoning.13
Role theory lends itself nicely to the study of judicial behavior, so it is
not at all surprising that social scientists would begin to look at trial judges
through these lenses.' 4 In an exploratory study of trial judges, Jackson
presents several interesting observations. First of all, most trial judges in his
sample did not perceive themselves as engaging in lawmaking. Trial judges
perceive the major aspects of their role to be problems of (1) objectivity and
fairness, (2) doing justice to the parties in litigation, (3) clearing the docket
of large numbers of cases filed. In contradiction, however, most judges
perceive themselves as possessing considerable discretionary powers. The
judges identified (in order of importance) lawyers, other judges, state
appellate judges, the "trial bar", jurors, and the public as their most
significant referents.'5 In a recent paper, Walker contends that trial judges
conceive of their roles on a "law-regarding - public-regarding"
continuum.1 6 Earlier research suggested that the trial judge perceives his role
in terms of a single precedent-situation orientation.'7 The latest research
suggests that the trial judge can be placed along two dimensions, public
orientation and precedent orientation, yielding four role-types-Law Applier,
Law Extender, Mediator, and Policymaker.'

The trial judge as a member of the "court organization" is a third
theme in the literature.'9 Here, for the most part, the focus has been on a pretrial dispositions and sentencing behavior. Before a case enters the trial
stage, the judge can have an enormous amount of influence on its
disposition; in fact, many argue that his influence before trial is greater than
after the trial begins. In the criminal process, the trial judge's role
perceptions, attitudes, and idiosyncracies constitute the environmental
structure in which bargaining takes place. Lawyers, as they bargain among
themselves, must also anticipate what sorts of "deals" the judge will find
acceptable. In the civil process, trial judges are very active in pre-trial
settlement, facilitating negotiations, suggesting - and sometimes forcing settlements. 20 Though he usually receives cues from probation officials,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, the trial judge must act alone in making
sentencing decisions. His discretion is wide, and its use depends upon many
complex variables, including individual attitudes, political culture,
recruitment systems, and defendants' characteristics. 2 '
Finally, trial judges themselves have generated a considerable literature,
not generally noted by social scientists, on what it means to be a trial judge.
These judges have explored in rich detail the complex role demands of trial
judging, suggesting that such a role entails much more than merely sitting
on the bench. 22
For all the recent progress made in the study of trial judges, social
scientists and lawyers know little or nothing about the motivational basis of
trial judging - and, I might add, the situation is no better at the appellate
level. Lawyers and judges themselves were the first to recognize the
tremendous influence over the decisional outputs of the courts that the
motivations of judges might have. In his famous Storrs Lectures of 1921,
Cardozo complained of the lack of candor on the part of judges and lawyers
about the psychological forces molding the law, remarking that "deep below
consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections
and the prejudices, the complex instincts and emotions and habits and
convictions, which make the man whether he be litigant or judge." 2 3 Jerome
Frank, steeped in the literature of psychoanalysis and the other social
sciences, called upon lawyers, judges, and citizens to abandon the illusory
goal of objectivity and certitude in the law. Rejecting the need for law as a
"father-figure", Frank wrote that "until we become thoroughly cognizant of,
and cease to be controlled by the image of the father hidden away in the
authority of the law, we shall not reach that first step in the civilized
administration of justice, the recognition that man is not made for law, but
that law is made by and for men." 24
Empirical evidence, however, on the role of psychological influences in
judicial decision-making has been, and still is, sparse and of uneven quality.
Examining the statistical records of New York City's Recorders' Courts in
1922, Haines found an extraordinary variation in the disposition of similar
cases by different judges. Those data led him to conclude that "justice
is a personal thing, reflecting the temperament, the personality, the
education, the environment, and personal traits of judges 2 5 Lasswell, most
noted for his seminal proposition that politicians displace their private
emotional needs upon public objects, presented a psychoanalytic portrait of
three trial judges (X, Y, and Z) whom he personally observed, collected
testimony on from friends and associates, and subjected to a psychiatric
2z

interview. 26 He found that two of the three fit his "agitator" and
"administrator" personality types; the third, though not fitting symmetrically
into Lasswell's typology, resembled most closely the "agitator".
In the following pages, I shall outline the basics of a method for
studying the motivations of trial judges - or any public officials, for that
matter - that I find particularly interesting and fruitful - "incentive
theory". The use of incentive theory is, in my view, a preliminary
contribution to an ongoing movement to fill glaring gaps in the literature
on judicial motivation and trial judging.
INCENTIVE THEORY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Incentive theory springs from several lines of research relating personal
motivation to political activity. Lasswell was among the first to suggest the
typologies of political motivations might be developed. Theorizing that
public men displace their conscious and unconscious private emotional needs
on their political behavior, as I noted earlier, Lasswell constructed a
typology of political actors, each category or type consisting of a syndrome
or collection of personality traits. 27 He argued that the most common of
these private needs leads to the seeking of power.
More than thirty years elapsed before anyone took action on Lasswell's
proposals. In the meantime, though, several scholars utilized motivational
typologies in a manner that left politicians' deep emotional needs implicit.
Clark and Wilson, for example, contend that three basic motivations draw
men into political organizations: Material; Solidary, deriving from the act of
participation itself, the conferring of status, prestige, etc.; and Purposive,
attained through achievement of organizational goals.28 In an empirical
piece,29 Wilson develops a two-fold classification of party members based on
the personal rewards sought: (1) the Professional, who is apt to be male,
oriented toward material incentives or careers in government, and is likely to
exhibit little concern with issues; and (2) the Amateur, who is not oriented
toward material rewards and participates in politics as a response to a
concern for a particular issue or set of issues. Building on Clark and
Wilson's work, Wildavsky classified the delegates to the Republican National
Convention of 1964 into two categories: (1) Purists, who emphasize internal
decisional rules, reject compromise, lack an orientation toward winning, and
stress the style and purity of decision. (2) Politicians, who believe in
compromise and bargaining, realize that public policy is developed
incrementally, are concerned with conciliating their opposition and
broadening their popular appeal, and are willing to bend in order to garner
public support.30
Specifically focussing on the emotional needs of politicians, Barber
developed a four-fold typology of political motivation to explain recruitment
and turnover in state legislatures 3 1 The motivations moving men to seek
public office have an influence over how they view their legislative role,
how they feel about their colleagues, and how they behave in the legislature.
By constructing a four-fold table with two variables (willingness to return to
the legislature and level of legislative activity), Barber came up with four
political personality types: (1) The Lawmaker, who enjoys working on
policy development and promoting particular issues; (2) The Advertiser, who
needs to gain attention, publicity, and prestige; (3) The Spectator, who seeks

to make friends and to gain social approval of the leaders; (4) The
Reluctant, who needs to fulfill a social duty, to accept a social
responsibility.
Flowing from Barber's theory of political personality is "incentive
theory", an approach to political motivation explicitly employed in previous
studies by Payne in Colombia, Virginia, and the Dominican Republic;3 2 by
Woshinsky in France and Connecticut;" and by McCullough in Brazil.3 4
Incentives are defined as "the emotional needs which individuals seek to fill,
or the satisfactions they get, through political participation." 3 These needs
explain why men participate in politics. Politicians' hours are never nine to
five - ten or twelve or fourteen hours a day is much closer to the mark.
Nor is the pay sufficient to compensate them for the amount of effort
exerted. In most political positions there is also a lack of security; fierce
competition is needed to stay where you are or to get ahead. Why then, do
people enter and remain in political life? Incentive theory provides an
answer to the question: emotional needs are filled, or satisfaction is gained,
through political participation.
Underlying incentive theory is a basic premise, that "participants behave
in a manner consistent with their incentives." 6 To be more exact, "other
things being equal, men will act in a manner which satisfies their basic
needs." 3 7 If one can uncover the motivations of political actors, he can then
predict their behavior more accurately; and, if one knows the incentives of
political actors, one can offer a substantial explanation of group and
individual behavior within an institution or political system. Given a similar
set of environmental constraints, men with different incentives will behave
differently. An institution or system dominated by politicians of one
incentive type will perform in a much different manner than institutions in
which another incentive pattern prevails.
In their research over the last few years, Payne and Woshinsky have
generated seven incentive types: Program, Game, Obligation, Conviviality,
Mission, Status, and Adulation. From the text of a personal interview in
which the respondent indicates his primary area of satisfaction (in addition
to numerous other traits and attitudes) one determines the incentive of a
particular political actor:
The interview reveals, first, the central interest or concern of the
participant. He talks about this subject more than any other; he is
enthusiastic and knowledgeable about it; and he voluntarily returns
to it during the interview. Because a persons' attention focuses
upon objects relevant to his satisfaction, these foci indicate his area
of satisfaction. This area of central concern is the main identifying
characteristic of the incentive.3 8
The process of classification is iterative, moving from reading of the
interview transcript to the incentive description and back to the transcript,
over and over again. Coding procedures suggested by Payne,3 9 involving a
relatively simple scoring system - or content analysis - permitting
quantitative validation of incentive classifications can be used and are
extremely helpful.
In research to date, Payne and others have rejected what would seem a
distinct possibility: politicians with more than one incentive. Payne stresses

- and I concur - that the fact that politicians have only one incentive is
of extraordinary utility:
It was often the presumed complexity of political motives which
discouraged researchers from pursuing the subject. With scores of
different motive combinations, analysis would become hopelessly
entangled.40

There is also the possibility that some politicians would not have an
incentive - i.e., they would not have an emotional need salient enough
to color the way they look at the world, their colleagues, and their jobs.
This has not proved a problem, however. Of the numerous politicians judges, bureaucrats, legislators, executives, party officials - interviewed,
In the case
only a minute percentage has defied incentive classification.
of inability to classify, one should differentiate between the respondent for
which the incentive is "unknown" and the one who has no incentive.
The "no incentive" classification (meaning a "respondent who does not
clearly exhibit any of the clusters of attitudes as appropriate to each
incentive when afforded ample opportunity for expression of such
attitudes") 4 ' has not as yet been utilized in incentive research. Perhaps the
most important reason for this is that one always suspects that one has
not generated enough data in order to make the difficult determination
that a politician has no incentive. Of the "no incentive" category, Payne
writes:
. . . one has to know clearly: (a) what incentives look like, and
(b) what a person with an incentive would have said. The "no
incentive" classification means, "I looked closely enough to have
seen something if it had been there." Therefore, to make it
requires more information than ascribing an incentive.42
One might expect "no incentive" politicians in small, rural communities.
In the study of urban trial judges, however, one should expect to find an
incentive in each case because (1) the role demands of the position are
heavy and (2) the probability of an accidental entry into the trial system
is almost zero.4 3
Incentive theory can be used to infer the behavioral properties of
political units (e.g., legislatures, nations, states, etc.) from the dominant
incentive found among the individuals in the unit under investigation.
This is a research strategy known as "building up", one entailing that
"individual psychological characteristics be observed in situ". 44 The
assumption upon which the strategy stands or falls is "that such limited,
short-term analyses can be proliferated and made to dovetail and cumulate
towards still larger explanations of aspects of system functioning." 45 The
obvious objection to this strategy is, "Can the theoretical leap from
individual incentive to system functioning be made successfully?" The
results of several studies in which the researchers employ a "building up"
strategy suggest that such a leap may indeed be fruitful. In a particularly
interesting study, Browning and Jacob examined the power, achievement,
and affiliational needs of politicians and businessmen in Connecticut and
Louisiana. Building up from the psychological properties of the
individuals, they were able to make more general statements about the
functioning of the political systems of Connecticut and Louisiana.4 6 The
logical process of building up, of course, must be very tight.

Finally, there is the charge that political life is not simple enough to
be explained by six or seven incentives. Of course I agree.
Categorizations are useful only insofar as they help us to make interesting
observations and obtain insights not otherwise possible. When one says,
for example, that a politician holds a program incentive, one is not
saying that his incentive is a full description or understanding of the
man; merely, that this classification seems to be useful in distinguishing
him from other politicians and predicting his behavior.47
DATA AND DESIGN
The present paper reports the findings of a study of state trial judges
in heavily urbanized cities in New Jersey. Its purpose is twofold: (1)
identification and description of trial judges' incentives; and (2)
examination of the relationships between motivational bases for judicial
participation and the attitudes and behavior of trial judges. The main
source of data is a set of personal interviews conducted with twenty-six
Superior Court and County Court judges in the winter of 1973 and the
summer of 1975. These are the basic trial courts of general jurisdiction
in New Jersey and handle both civil and criminal matters. The choice of
New Jersey as a research site was dictated by its geographical proximity.
There has been little research on the judicial process in New Jersey,48
but several aspects of the recruitment process and judicial administration are
relevant to the present discussion. First, the Governor makes all judicial
appointments with the advice and consent of the State Senate. In practice,
however, judges are selected through a process in which the Governor's staff
and the party leaders and State Senator from the county where the position
is open participate. The bar association's committee on judicial
qualifications screens all the candidates and classifies them as "qualified",
"well-qualified", or "unqualified". The custom established, though
occasionally violated, is that the Governor will not appoint anyone labeled
"unqualified". Judicial appointments are bipartisan, i.e., the two major
parties alternate making judicial appointments. Second, the judiciary in New
Jersey is divided into a Supreme Court, Superior Courts, County Courts,
Municipal Courts, and District Courts.49 The Superior Court consists of
Law, Chancery, and Appellate Divisions. Finally, because of the role
demands they place on the trial judge, four facets of judicial administration
are important: (1) the Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court is the
administrative head of the court system and has the power to assign any
judge to sit temporarily in any court; (2) each judge must account for time
spent on and off the bench, the name and nature of each case heard, and
the result of cases yet undecided in a weekly report to Administrative Office
of the Courts; (3) if the decision of a case is delayed, the judge must explain
in writing the reasons behind such delay; and (4) the Assignment Judge,
appointed by the Chief Justice, constructs calendars for each judge within
his jurisdiction.
Throughout the presentation that follows, I shall marshall evidence,
consisting of lengthy verbatim quotations of comments made by the
respondents in the course of the interview, in support of inferences made
about characteristics present in the basic incentive syndromes the judges
disply. Lengthy quotations are utilized because only they bring home the

"reality" of the incentive. Though it sacrifices some literary precision in the
course, this mode of presentation preserves rich content otherwise lost. To
complement this evidence, I shall discuss the relationships between judicial
backgrounds and judicial incentives. Finally, in order to assess the
explanatory power of incentive theory, I shall analyze the impact, if any, of
judicial incentives on role perceptions, and feelings about the independence
of trial judges vis-a-vis administrative authorities.
JUDICIAL INCENTIVES IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS
In their research thus far, as noted earlier, Payne and his associates
have encountered seven different incentive types. In the present study,
however, I found only game, status, program, and obligation judges. Of
course, in the context of American urban politics, one would not expect
to find incentives, seemingly peculiar to Latin America, such as adulation
or mission.
The Game Judge.
The trial judge with a game incentive derives his emotional satisfaction
from applying and exhibiting his skills in a structured, challenging, and
competitive situation; he perceives the judicial process as a complex game.
Unlike the program judge, he is not attracted to the bench by a desire to
piece together specific bits of law into a coherent mass; nor is he attempting
to gain position or prestige. His motivation "lies . . . simply in his desire to
take an active part in an ongoing, exciting series of events involving a
complex mixture of human interactions." 0 When asked about specific
accomplishments, he cannot put his fingers on any. Once the "game" is
over, the game judge's memory of the subject of competition is hazy. Issues
and cases in and of themselves are not salient to him; he relishes the
personal interaction of the courtroom:
You can't talk of accomplishments as such. You hope you're doing
a good job. If you want to think of a good job, if you preside over
a jury trial and the jury's verdict is sustained by the appellate
courts, that's a good feeling. You do a lot of work, though, not
subject to appeal.
His reaction is pale in contrast to the richness of the replies elicited from
program judges on their personal accomplishments. The same judge
demonstrates his delight with being a judge on the stage in his courtroom,
his love of the action of the trial court, by his dread of a position on an
appellate court:
I don't think I'd relish the job of an appellate judge, because
there you don't get any contact with the bar. I wouldn't want
to be cooped up, reading and writing in my office all day.
By the game judge's measure, activity for activity's sake is the most
important aspect of his job, not the cases he handles.
He understands well the norms by which his courtroom is run
harmoniously. To keep the competition a "game", one must never let
the case or issue at hand devolve into a personal conflict:

You have a personal reaction, but your judicial temperament
should control this; you must have self-discipline. No matter
what is said, you have to maintain a certain amount of decorum.
I've had the experience with defendants of going through a long,
arduous process of pleadings in which the defendant evokes a
strong reaction in me. But in these cases, I disqualify myself
and hand the case to another judge, so my personal feelings
won't enter into the trial.
The ideal of the adversary process involves two parties who are
attempting to push their own versions of the "truth" as far as the court
will permit. Trial judges must understand the nature of the game and
take it into account when handling lawyers. The courtroom "fight" is
bound to degenerate into uncontained conflict on occasion. The judge, as
arbiter of the "fight", must guard against this happening too often, for
the continuing playing of the game depends upon a stable structure within
which participants may compete:
Generally, you get cooperation. You might get a heated point of
contention between the lawyers; they may be adamant on a
certain point, and you'll have to put a halt to it. But they
want to help the client - you can't fault the attorney for
pushing his case. You hit the same thing in a civil case; he
thinks his client is in the right, so he pushes his own case.
You try to settle the point, interpret the "rules of evidence".
If avoiding "personalization" of the game is important in the courtroom,
the principle takes on added meaning when the trial judge is dealing
with his superiors. The very existence of the judicial system depends
upon open lines of communication between the trial and appellate
levels." But a certain personal distance seems to make this task a bit
easier:
I know some of the people in the Supreme Court and the Appellate
Division of the Superior Court. I have worked with some of
them. Some of my cases have been affirmed, others overturned.
But this is never done on a personal basis. I've never heard that
this was the case. You're bound to know them, meet them,
know of them, but no real close relationships, though.
The game judge seems to evaluate the judicial office in terms of the terms
amount of manipulation it affords him, not its prestige-rating in society.
He quite readily differentiates between himself and the office:
(What is the reaction of people in court to you?) To me as a person
I assume that they are being respectful, not to me, but to my
position.

.

..

(What do you enjoy about the work?) There's no one particular
work, the whole trial system, getting involved with the lawyers,
their competition in court. I had no particular plan to become
a judge in my mind, but since I've become one, I enjoy it
immensely. You never have anything happen twice.

You're able to control things. Theoretically, a judge is supposed to
sit back and watch things happen, but that's a theory. I try to
run my courtroom so that everyone gets a fair shake. If I see
some lawyer out there that doesn't know what he's doing. I may
sometimes jump in and try to even things up a bit. You're
doing the best you can do to see to it that justice is done.
Sometimes it isn't. But then your control makes it that.
Sometimes you can't control something . . . sometimes you not

only can't, you shouldn't.
The words and phrases the game judges use betray their orientation to
politics and law: "involved with", "control things", "competition in court",
"jump in and even things up a bit", etc. He fulfills an emotional need
through interaction in a tightly-structured, competitive situation. In another
political culture, perhaps he would have found business the best
environment in which to test his skills.52 Law and politics in New Jersey,
however, provide him with a wide range of contests in which to compete;
the situation he has chosen - the trial court - affords him broader scope
for manipulation than many others.
Finally, the game judge demonstrates obvious delight in setting up a
strategy, listing factors and considerations, and ticking off conditions
necessary for its successful completion:
(How did you get appointed to the bench?) Get into the party, you
must get yourself well-known, make a good reputation as a lawyer.
If the rest of the lawyers seem to trust you, they may give you a
chance. . . I had a political background. I had as much possible
advancement of my name, talked to political leaders, State Senators,
the Governor's Office in order to try as hard as possible to solicit
this office - to suggest my desire for the office.

Let me tell you how this happened. When I was years old, I
started practicing law, later than most start. I went in with a local
man here who had a big trial practice and I did nothing but try
cases and try them pretty well. Pretty good reputation for winning
cases. In 19
, Governor
put my name into the Senate for
County Court Judge. This was to be a Republican appointment.
However, any appointment is subject to some control by the county
chairman or powers that be. And the Republican chairman, I'm
told, put the thumb on me that I was either not a good
Republican or if I was, I was such a poor one or I hadn't been
involved long enough to be sufficiently enough qualified for the
job. So I never got the job. I was never confirmed. The Senate just
sat on it for nine months until Governor
out of office.
So, because of that, I had a falling out with my employer. He had
always wanted the job, but he was never going to get it. As a
result, I left him and started my own practice. The practice got
bigger and better and it occurred to me that there might come a
time in later years when the opportunity might arise again where I
might be appointed, so I decided I would become active in the
Republican Party. Active only in the sense that the party was
___was

desperate for candidates. It was a loser deal. They needed a
candidate for the
, someone who'd put his neck out on the
line, and I went out. I ran and lost. No problem in losing. But
now I was a Republican!!! Three years later, Governor
appointed me to the County Court and they (the Party Chairmen)
couldn't say a damned word about it!!!
How do the background characteristics of game trial judges differ from
those of his colleagues? (See Table I.) First, game judges tend to have
Table I
Incentives and Background Characteristicsof Trial Judges
Game

Program

Status

Obligation

Average Age

61.6

58.5

55.0

58.0

Out-of-state law school

33.0%

60.0%

33.0%

50.0%

Average length of
judicial service

12.0

8.3

10.1

14.0

Parents interested or
active in politics

100.0%

60.0%

33.0%

100.0%

Held other elective or
appointive office

100.0%

60.0%

67.0%

100.0%

Identifies self as a
"politician"

100.0%

60.0%

33.0%

0.0%

Originated activity to
get judgeship

100.0%

40.0%

100.0%

0.0%

Religion (percent
Catholic or Jewish)

100.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Partisan identification
(percent Democratic)

67.0%

70.0%

33.0%

100.0%

6

10

6

4

N

accumulated more bench experience than other types - if one excludes the
obligation judge. Second, he is, on the average, older than the other trial
judges. Third, game judges tend to come from instate law schools. Fourth,
more than others, game judges have held other elective or appointive office,
report parental interest or activity in politics, identify themselves as
politicians, and admit to having originated activity to obtain a judgeship.
These men also tend to be Democratic and Catholic. From the data, both
qualitative and quantitative, one can construct a picture of a judge who
enjoys politics immensely, considers judging an extension of politics, and
makes no bones about the interconnections of law and politics.
The Program Judge.
The individual holding a program incentive enjoys the role of the
trial judge, by and large, because it allows him to work on and solve
challenging problems in the administration of justice. The motivation is

similar to that of Barber's Lawmakers. Unlike the program politicians
that Payne and Woshinsky have encountered, however, the trial judge
whose incentive is programmatic does not usually enter politics in order
to participate in debate on specific issues or the formulation of public
policies. For the most part, the program judge enters public life because
of the nature of private law practice." Programmatic trial judges are
realistic about the reasons for their appointment:
When I went to law school, any law school was a hotbed or
politics, most lawyers are in politics as a matter of survival. I
to

commuted from

with a group of

eight guys, and two of them got interested with me in the
Young Democrats. But I didn't have the political background,
really, my family was split

.

.

. and I didn't have a strong

identification with the Democratic Party as I grew up. It was
more because of local politics, not national politics, that I
became interested. To get to be a judge in New Jersey, you
need sponsorship. The firm I was associated with had
as a partner - I got awfully close to
Congressman
it. I lucked out; I got my first appointment in 19
The program judge has the ability of looking at himself and his place in
the world of politics in an objective manner. Asked how he would rate
his performance as a judge, one replied:
I'm satisfied with myself that I did the best I could. And, as I
say, outside of a couple of incidents in which policemen wrote
in and complained, I've never had any criticism.
(How did you get appointed?) There are two ways. You would have to
be such an outstanding scholar of the law that you would be
recognized by the appointing authority. Or you would take it
the way I did it. If you want a judge to be a Phi Beta Kappa
type in his knowledge of the law, I don't put myself in that
class. I think that I would be, without hesitation, average.
. . . the appointment comes from the Governor and he will
name this Phi Beta Kappa type because of his knowledge and
his activity in the law that has been outstanding. This other
way, you will graduate from law school, be very successful in the
practice of law. You're fairly sucessful with the leadership. You
see, I was part and parcel of that. And when I wanted to
become a judge, I was in a position to speak to those above and
say, "I'm interested in becoming a judge."
Though he can look at
greatest legal mind ever
to recognize that he has
respectable job. Hence,
oriented.

himself objectively and admit he is not the
to sit on the bench, he also has the self-esteem
other valuable qualities, and that he had done a
the program judge is, first and foremost, reality-

He is interested in problems and their solutions. When one turns to
the focus of his energies, the program incentive emerges:
(What are the most important problems you have here?) Finding
alternatives to, finding solutions within the homes. Most
problems are outside the home. We just don't have enough

alternatives; it's either reformatory or letting the juvenile go free
again. We really need more money to get these alternatives.
Very practically speaking, we need more foster homes. There are
a lot of things needed: better and more family services,
psychiatric help for poor families and many other services either
not provided adequately or not at all.

.

.

. The most important

aspect is to rehabilitate. And I think we're honest in that desire.
To the contrary, in criminal courts, they talk a lot about
rehabilitation, but they don't really do it. Our job is to
rehabilitate those who come into our court.
His primary interest is in accomplishing the perceived goal of his court,
rehabilitation. Frustrations, thus, are greatest when this goal is thwarted.
Moreover, he can hardly hide his distaste for fellow judges who merely
give lip service to the proper function of courts. The program incentive is
also demonstrated in his desire to have more policy options to exercise in
his duties - in order better to effectuate the "program" in which he
invests his energies. This type of trial judge plunges into detailed
discussions of problems he is in the process of solving upon the slightest
provocation of the interviewer. For him working on problems is a
reward in itself. Prestige, money, and friendship are of only secondary
interest to him in politics. He fills his emotional needs through the
solution of complex problems.
The programmatic trial judge does not rebel against his superiors in
the judicial hierarchy; the system is impersonal, so one does not interpret
demands as threats to one's position:
I was very friendly with the former Administrative Director; we
knew each other well for years, got along, knew each other well
and on a personal basis in my administrative work and reports
and things. As a matter of fact, I sat for
years on the
Committee, and I served as
Supreme Court's
Chairman, which I found very interesting. I've always gotten
along all right with people in administrative areas and
Assignment Judges. (What causes tensions in the relations?) It's
the personal antagonisms that they connect with assignments,
demanding that they do some further work on the reports that
go to the taxpayer.
His attitude toward his superiors is that of a man who is deeply
interested in his own job, is preoccupied with interesting problems to
solve, and who can look at others objectively:
I feel no pressure. I spend a lot of time reading memos from
the Administrative Office, though. I don't feel that there is
pressure. (What kind of a job do you think your superiors are
doing?) I think it's excellent. I would say that it's one of the
best (supreme courts) in the country. I don't have any
association with them at all, except for two in.
They're in a whole different ballpark. You see them once a
year at the Conference in Cherry Hill, just before the start of the
session. You just don't deal with them; you deal with the
Assignment Judge.
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Though he feels that his superiors are doing a fine job, he really does
not have extensive dealings with them, and he seems not to be overly
concerned about the situation. He stresses instead his interest in
particular public policies.
And he seems to have no more than an average amount of trouble
getting along with his fellow workers in the courtroom organization:
I find them (lawyers) extremely cooperative people. I really
enjoy working with them. Especially with the younger lawyers,
I try to help them when I can. Whenever I see a problem or a
weakness in a young lawyer, I call him aside and point it out.
If it's during a trial, I'll be sure to let him know, so that he
can correct it. . . . When I get into court, I should be prepared.

The lawyers will start to explain their cases and I will be able
to expedite matters by already knowing their arguments.
Whenever you go into court, you should be prepared; you should
have your homework done.
The satisfaction the program judge derives from engaging in problemsolving causes him to develop the expectation that others involved in the
same process should be as diligent as he in preparing themselves. His
interest in substantive matters colors his views of others. The norm of
"hard work" has been discussed at length in the literature on legislative
behavior.54 He becomes annoyed with those who do not do their
"homework":
I always tried to be prepared in my work, whether as a judge or
an attorney. And I get impatient with those who aren't. I try
to do my best on each job I do. I see many younger lawyers
who just aren't doing their jobs as best they can. This is one
thing I don't like. You should do your best on cases, spend a
lot of time on them.
The pragmatic nature of the judge with a program incentive rejects
panaceas; he is a man who wants something that will work. When
asked his opinion about a certain judicial reform proposal, one judge
remarked:
Most people talk but they don't come out with most of the
solutions they have in mind. We can say that about anything
you want - we can say there's a waste and we should go
without this or that, but unless you come up with something to
take its place you're not helping much.
Yet piecemeal reforms that seem to have the promise of being both
realistic and effective are accepted with pleasure:
We have this no-fault which may take care of negligence cases,
but of course, the other cases will be with us. We might
eliminate the group in which they don't amount to much they never get into litigation and that might be a help.
Thus, two of the characteristics distinguishing program judges from others
are: (1) he is interested in the stability and orderliness of the institution
in which he functions, because they are prerequisites for a facilitative

environment for managing and solving problems; and (2) he demonstrates
a positive orientation to compromise; it is, of course, necessary for the
successful solution of pressing problems.
The backgrounds of program judges are different from those of others
in several respects. First, he has served a relatively short time on the
bench. It may be, as Sarat suggests, "that there is a transition from
program to game type which occurs the longer a judge has been on the
bench, a transition from specific problems to a more ritualistic activity
orientation."5 5 My data seem to support such an interpretation. But, of
course, more ingenious research designs are needed to test such an
hypothesis. Of all the incentive types, more program judges have
graduated from out-of-state law schools, most of which are policy-or issueoriented in teaching style. Though the program judge comes from a
politically oriented family more often than his status colleague, he is less
likely to be from one than are game or obligation judges. He also tends
to have had little experience in appointive or elective office. Unlike
Sarat's program judges, most did not seek a judgeship, most claim to
have been drafted. Yet a good portion consider themselves "politicians.
Finally, program judges are Protestant and Democratic, suggesting
parallels with Wilson's research on "amateur Democrats."
The Status Judge.
The status participant is in politics to demonstrate to himself and
others that he is indeed an adequate human being. To prove his
adequacy, he seeks the social prestige inhering in political positions - he
seeks respect and deference from others. His focus is on the judgments
of worth or "success" made by society at large, not on particular policies,
issues or cases. For the status judge, the bench is of value because of
the social prestige attached to it, not the latitude it affords in problemsolving, game-playing, or conscience-soothing. He is abnormally
preoccupied with getting and keeping positions, his own personal political
history, and the strategy and tactics of campaigning and politicking. A
cool attitude is taken toward leaders because they are above him, and he
resents any possibility of being controlled. Moreover, in discussing the
motives of others, he projects upon them evil and selfish designs. Though
he may claim to enjoy politics, the status judge does not. For the status
judge, then, life in the world of politics is "nasty, poor, brutish, and
short". He feels that other men are to be stepped on or stepped over;
cooperation is not possible.
Payne and Woshinsky observe that the status politician has a
"tendency to be brisk and formal in the interview". 56 They attribute this
to "his need to establish his own importance, to impress others with his
status, and to escape the dependent role of respondent." Contrary to my
initial expectation, one status judge demonstrated his incentive by talking
openly, freely, permitting me to ask a question after a forty-minute
monologue. Thus, he escaped the dependent role via the lecture method,
demonstrating to me that he was not under my control.
The status trial judge has a cynical view of the motives and behavior
of other judges - especially those higher up in the judiciary. He views
men as base in their seeking of power; it seems to be part of human
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nature. The military imagery in his references to judges makes obvious
his consciousness of rank, i.e., status:
I was aboard a ship during the war for three years . . . about

fifteen officers and one hundred and twenty men lived together
all the time. I never saw a ship captain who wasn't a son of a
bitch. They weren't that way when they became a captain sometimes maybe they were - it's something about the job that
makes them that way. You never know what a captain is like
until he gets on the bridge of the ship. You never know what a
judge is like until he gets on the bench. . . . The position rocks
most people because most people cannot handle authority; they
abuse it; they want to be captains; judges want to be ship
captains. When you get a person that way, it is an imposition of
the lawyers, it is very difficult. I've seen the ship captains in
operation in the State of New Jersey.
The animosity toward authority is manifest throughout. "Captains" are
above him and are, therefore, a threat to him because they reveal what he
is not -

a "Captain".

A view toward cooperation among men is not in the nature of the
status trial judge. Asked about his future plans, one said he might retire
tomorrow, or he might not. Then he confided to me that someone was
already attempting to obtain his position, the moral to him being that
"people are always trying to stab you in the back."
Though lawyers are not as bad as most professionals, the richest and
best-known - who have more prestige than he - are a selfish and
greedy lot:
If you're handling a matter with a lot of money, you've got a
problem, a real problem. Because lawyers want the money. And
I've seen some of the most dignified in the profession here in
this state on an estate before me behave very, very badly when it
comes to putting pressure on the judge for his money. I think
the best lawyers can behave like bums. I'm talking about highclass lawyers, not some shyster. But these people in the other
professions, don't worry, they are worse.
Unlike other judges in the sample, who had to be questioned
specifically about their education before giving me any such information,
one status judge volunteered his accomplishments:
My academic background is 19-,

University of

,

I was in

the top ten percent, on the law review - back when it meant
something-and served as clerk to the Chief Judge of the
U.S. Court of Appeals.
In parading his symbols of status before me, he demonstrates that he is a
"success" - after all, he has been recognized as such. Moreover, he
accentuates the prestige-value of his tenure on the law review by
insinuating that the honor is no longer given for reasons of merit - as
it was in his day.
The judicial bureaucracy draws the wrath of the status trial judge.

One, in fact, was almost obsessed with the idea he no longer has control
over his activities:
Talking about this built-in bureaucracy

.

. .

the gauge for being

a good Assignment Judge is what kind of storm trooper or ship
captain he is. He's got to be a judge who'll force them through
the production line. Keep that calendar moving. So, he's got that
power. . . . The problem is that in this chain of command,

when you get down to the trial level, I get it; I'm on the
receiving end of a lot of people not around me who are telling
me what to do. Sometimes it's helpful; sometimes it's not. But
there is so much administrative control over us that we have lost
the right to run our own courtroom. Now, all of this has an
emotional impact on the judge. You've got great pressures on
administratively.
While program and game judges understand the need for bureaucracy and
can look at it objectively, the status judge perceives it as a threat to his
independence; he fears being controlled. For him, the judicial process is a
taxing emotional experience. It is taxing because he cannot get along
with his fellow judges. As Woshinsky points out, the status participant's
"personalization of all political events make politics a series of intense
emotional experiences for him. Because of his emotional involvement in
politics, seemingly trivial events may trigger strong emotional reactions." 57
Status judges repeatedly mentioned conflicts, all rooted in "personalities."
One judge was queried at length concerning the functioning of his
courtroom. The relevant portion of the reply concerns the personal
relations in his court. Clearly, I think, he evaluates himself by the
opinions of others and judges his "success" by external, rather than
internal, standards:
Are we harmonious? I think that if you check out with any of
the people I do business with, that they will say that the Judge
who is one of the deans of the legal
has a happy ship.
profession, was in my office the other day and asked me, "Judge,
where do you get your compassion? Please don't retire from the
bench; we need you. Where did you get your compassion?"
The story is calculated to show me, as well as himself, that he is indeed
an important person who is needed and has desirable personal qualities.
Further, note that in telling the story, he refers to himself as "Judge",
seemingly indicating that he feels more secure as "Judge" than he does as
himself. His success is symbolized by a "dean" of the legal profession
deeming him "indispensable".
In terms of his background, the status judge is a bit younger than his
colleagues and tends to have attended an in-state law school. Compared to
others, fewer report parent interest or activity in politics or consider
themselves politicians. But two-thirds held a public office before coming
to the bench and all admitted having initiated activity for judicial office.
Finally, he tends to be Protestant and Republican.
The Obligation Judge.
The trial judge who is moved by an obligation incentive resembles

closely the "Purist" Wildavsky found in his analysis of the 1964
Republican Convention and the "Reluctant" Barber developed in his study
of freshmen legislators. The desire to fulfill a social obligation
characterizes this type. For the obligation judge, political activity helps to
relieve feelings of guilt he possesses. His anxiety is brought about by the
perception of a "discrepancy between his normative beliefs and his failure
to act upon them." 5 8 The decision to enter politics is a moral one for
him:
I would have to say that, as far as a philosophy of life, a career
in political office has tended to reinforce the ideas I have: that
one of the first things someone could do was not to go out and
make money but to contribute something of his potential to the
general good. Though I've had discouragements and disappointments from time to time, I'd have to say that, basically, it has
been reinforced.
Discussing the most important aspect of his job, the obligation judge
emphasizes the style by which one should make decisions; he stresses
process, not substance:
To maintain the confidence not only of the bar, but the public
generally. It's really an immense burden to call upon an
individual - a judge - to hear factual testimony without a
jury, to make resolutions of fact, conferring on some witnesses or
falsifying a testimony or have blurred or hazy recollections that
can't be believed, yet to reach a decision on the facts of cases
fitting those factual determinations within a body of law which
is not as clear or explicit as I'm suggesting. And to come out of
it where, perhaps the losing litigant and attorney, nonetheless,
say, "we have had a fair trial and that was an impartial result.
It was based on reasoning and it had no prejudice or outright
mistake in it as far as the law is concerned." I think that's the
chief burden I'm facing.
The obligation trial judge emphasizes both his integrity and that of the
court. Symbols and forms - the "appearance of justice" - instead of
results, are the focus of his energies. That he describes his job as a
"'burden," i.e., a duty which must be borne, is indicative of the
orientation he has toward the adjudicatory process.
For the obligation judge, the freedom to follow the dictates of his
conscience in making decisions is a cherished value. Unlike the attorney
who is practicing, the trial judge may use normative principles to decide
cases, having no regard to the practical restraints of his environment.
Probably I would miss most having the opportunity to consider
and decide cases on what I thought the merits were without any
consideration as to what a client wanted or what a client's
position was. I have the luxury, you might say, which the
practicing attorney does not have. Considering both sides of the
case, whatever my predilections or prejudices. That I have been
able to search out all the law and all the facts to the best of my
ability, and then to reach a decision not bound by an attorneyclient relationship.

The obligation trial judge's relationships with his superiors in the
judicial hierarchy are tense; his perceptions of the role of the trial judge,
especially decision-making style, make this collision almost inevitable.
(Are the relationships good?) Probably not. But that may be the
result of a case I decided. The Supreme Court rule on

was developed. I would say that my relationship with the Chief
Justice
Court was very abrasive and I hope that they're
improved with the Chief Justice
Court. (Why the poor
relationship?) I think that most trial judges who have courage,
you might say, in carving out the law in areas where it had not
been carved out before. I tended to find that there was absolutely
no approval or commendation for it. And, if anything, it was
regarded with disfavor: "What do you think you're doing,
making the law in this state?" That sort of thing.
I must emphasize that my sample is so small that caution is necessary
in making any inferences. But, contrary to other research, I find the
obligation judge about as old and even more experienced than his
colleagues on the trial bench. On the one hand, he reports family
involvement in politics and has held previous political office. On the
other hand, he refuses to identify himself as a "politician" or to admit
that he initiated a campaign for judicial office. The portrait, then, is one
of a trial judge who considers himself a "citizen" and a law officer, not
a "politician", despite frequent forays into the political arena.59
JUDICIAL INCENTIVES AND JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
The previous section demonstrated the rich descriptive power of
incentive analysis; it captures, in vivid terms, the multi-faceted nature of
trial judging. The theoretical utility of incentive analysis in the study of
trial judges depends, however, upon its ability to explain or predict
judicial behavior or attitudes. Trial judging, as the quotations I have
presented suggest, involves a variety of functions, administrative as well as
judicial. In the present paper, however, I have limited myself to a very
small segment of the trial judge's attitudes and behaviors: role perceptions,
and feelings about the independence of trial judges vis-a-vis administrative
authorities.
Role Perceptions.
The normative concept of a role " is a pleasing notion in that it
immediately explains in an intuitive manner much of the conflict that
has occurred among judges" and scholars concerning the proper behavior
of common-law judges in a democratic polity.6 0 Though discussions of
the normative role of judges have in the past been mainly polemical in
content, in recent years political scientists have begun to explore the
61
In Civil Liberties and
empirical dimensions of judicial role perceptions.
the Vinson Court, C. Herman Pritchett explained the theoretical
significance of the concept of role:
Every judge in deciding a case must give some thought to what
is appropriate for him as a judge to do. The pressures which
bear upon him are many, and they are mostly toward a pattern
I
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of conformity - conformity with the tradition of the law,
conformity with public expectations as to how a judge should
act, conformity toward established divisions of authority in a
federal system based on the principle of separation of powers.
While no justice can be oblivious to these pressures, they are not
self-enforcing and he is free to make his own interpretations of
their requirement.62
Of the many consequential dimensions of judicial role, the present
research focuses on orientations toward two objects, precedent and the
public. The first, precedent orientation, "concerns the judges' perceptions
of their relationship to former and present judges, particularly those who
set precedents in courts superior to their own." The second, public
orientation, concerns "the judge's relationship with the public which he
serves, whether he views his role as a matter of settling individual
disputes between a limited number of litigants or one of creating policy
63
for a larger class of citizens."
Each of the judges interviewed in this study was presented two
batteries of statements concerning his role vis-a-vis his colleagues, past and
present, and the public.64 Because of his desire to demonstrate to others
his own power and prestige, I hypothesized that status judges would be
most willing to approve a creative role for judging at the trial level. The
obligation judge, because he is concerned with the normative style of
decision-making, should be most begrudging of the exercise of discretion.
Program judges are interested in concrete policy accomplishments, so they
should closely resemble the status judges in terms of precedent orientation.
Because he is acutely aware of the importance of following the "rules of
the game", the game judge should more closely resemble the obligation
judge.
The responses to the precedent scale, presented in Table 2, show
Table 2
Precedent Orientations of Trial Judges
Game

Program

Status

Obligation

High

67%

70%

100%

100%

Low

33%

30%

0%

0%

6

10

6

4

N

mixed results. First of all, there is a relatively high regard for precedent
throughout the sample. Contrary to expectation, status judges demonstrate
"high" regard for precedent as an element in decision-making. There is,
however, no readily apparent reason for such a pattern; and reexamination
of the interviews discloses no clues. Perhaps status judges find other areas
of the judicial turf better outlets for their anxieties. In line with my
hypothesis, obligation judges showed a high degree of respect for
precedent. Unexpectedly, however, game judges are more like program, not
obligation, judges. From a reading of the interviews, it is my impression
that game judges, despite an acute awareness of the "rules", are more
tolerant of the ambiguities inherent in any decisional process than are

their obligation-oriented colleagues. That most program judges are also
precedent-oriented is not, as it first seems, a paradox. Once again drawing
on the interview data, I gather that the program judge believes that, even
if he follows precedent in a religious fashion, there are still enough
interstices to permit a considerable amount of policy accomplishment.
The obligation judge, because of his strict feelings about internal
decisional criteria, should be more oriented toward the individual than the
community. Geared to results and not decisional rules, program judges
should steer a middle-course. The status judge, since his primary source
of satisfaction is the respect and deference of others, should be more
public-regarding than other trial judges. Game judges, concerned with
process and not result, should bear close resemblance to their obligation
colleagues.
"Public orientations" of the trial judges appear in Table 3. The
Table 3
Public Orientations of Trial Judges
Game

Program

Status

Obligation

Individual

67%

40%

33%

50%

Community

33%

60%

67%

50%

6

4

N

6

10

results, once again, are mixed. First of all, the obligation judges split on
the individual-community dimension. Upon reconsideration, this finding is
not unreasonable. Different judges feel different sorts of obligations. In the
present sample, some are deeply committed to serving their individual
conceptions of right; others, to serving the public's conception of right but both of these commitments are "internalized". Though not all status
judges focus on the community, the relationship is the correct direction.
Program judges, following expectation, divide their attention about evenly
between the individual and the community. Finally, in accord with the
hypothesis, game judges focus more on the individual than on the
community.
By constructing a fourfold table with two variables, precedent- and
public-orientation, one comes up with four ideal role types. The Law
Applier is characterized by the high regard he has for precedent; neither
societal needs nor social consequences of his decisions are legitimate
criteria in choice-making. The Law Extender, like his colleague, the Law
Applier, feels that nearly all cases can be decided using precedent. Unlike
the Law Applier, he is clearly conscious of societal needs and the social
consequences of his decisions. Following Walker, one might say that he is
both public-regarding and law-regarding. 65 The Mediator places low on
both scales; he is not sanguine about finding clear and relevant precedents
in every case he decides; nor does he seek to conform his decisions to
public needs. He is, as Flango and associates observe, "inclined to rely
largely on his own common sense and understanding of the meaning of 6 6
justice to reach his decision," rather than on public needs or desires.
Placing low on precedent orientation and high on public orientation, the
01

Policymaker feels that he should be making socially-relevant decisions, not
engaging in mere dispute settlement. He is expected to be a proponent of
the explicitly political functions of courts.
Table 4 presents the distribution of role perceptions among the trial
Table 4
Distribution of Judicial Role Perceptions
Game
Law Applier

67%

Mediator

0%

Law Extender

0%

Policy Maker

33%

N

6

Program
40%
0%
30%

Status

Obligation

33%

50%

0%
67%

0%
50%

30%

0%

0%

10

6

4

judges in this sample. The results do not coincide completely with what
one might expect, but the relationships are in the correct directions.
Game judges, expected to be dominated by Mediators, instead perceive
themselves as Law Appliers. (There are, in fact, no Mediators in the
sample.) But the distributions of role perceptions among game and status
judges are quite different. Though several program judges are Law
Appliers, more than half are either Law Extenders or Policymakers. The
status judges, following expected patterns, are more discretion-oriented and
individual-oriented. Some of the obligation judges, as I noted earlier, feel
strongly that their internalized decisional criteria should be those of the
public. Thus, contrary to expectation, these judges conceptualize their role
as Law Extender.
The Independence of Trial Judges.
Up until quite recently, the power of the trial judge in his own court
was absolute; he was sovereign on his own turf.67 But no longer. The
independent trial judge, as Cook said of one-judge courts, "is going the
way of the one-room schoolhouse. Structural change is forcing established
judges to adjust their role definitions and performance to suit the
requirements" of modern administrative controls.68 The pressure of
litigation, the increasing complexity of cases, and insufficient budgeting
have forced increased restrictions on the discretion of the "independent
trial judge." 69 It is no secret that many trial judges chafe under modern
administrative controls. 70
From several closed-ended and open-ended items, I have determined
each judge's orientation to administrative control. There are two basic
types, "traditionals" and "moderns." The first, traditionals, feel strongly
that administrative controls usurp their prerogatives and threaten
independence of substantive judicial decision-making. Moderns, on the
other hand, feel that some restrictions on judicial discretion are both
necessary and sometimes helpful.
I had certain expectations concerning the relationship between judicial

incentive and modernism-traditionalism. First, because of his desire to
demonstrate his power to others, to maximize his own discretion, the
status judge should take on a traditional orientation. The obligation judge
- also desirous of maximum discretion, because of his conscience, not
recognition - should also be traditional in his orientation. Third, both
program and game judges are tolerant of structural limitations, so one
should expect both to be moderns; but, because of a greater need for
manipulative scope, the game judges will also have a tendency to feel
circumscribed by administrative controls.
The results, presented in Table 5, fit expectations quite well. First,
Table 5
The Independence of Trial Judges
Game

Program

Status

Obligation

100%

100%

Traditionals

67%

40%

Moderns

33%

60%

0%

0%

6

10

6

4

N

game and program judges are more tolerant of limits on their discretion,
and the game judges are more jealous of their prerogatives. Second, both
status and obligation judges are "traditionals", wed to classical notions of
judicial independence.
CONCLUSION
Incentive theory, I observed earlier, is a particularly interesting and
fruitful method of studying the motivations of trial judges. Though the
study presented here is exploratory, I believe nonetheless that the results
justify my optimism. There is no doubt that incentive analysis has a rich
descriptive power, capturing the multi-faceted nature of trial judging more
adequately than other approaches. The data marshalled here suggest, too,
that incentive theory has considerable explanatory or predictive power.
I would like to conclude by directing attention to a couple of
directions for future research. First, there is a need for more sophisticated
behavioral indices, covering thoroughly all aspects of trial judging, to put
the discriminatory power of incentive analysis to a more rigorous test.
Second, "building up," a task I have eschewed because of the exploratory
nature of this study, should be pursued. Comparison of judicial incentives
in states with divergent selection systems, political cultures, administrative
structures, and career patterns should prove helpful. Entire "courtroom
teams" should be examined to develop a fund of data on how
combinations of incentives in courtroom teams influence behavioral
patterns of both individuals and systems as a whole.
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0f all the powers of the trial judge, perhaps the most studied, most important, and most
likely to be affected by emotional characteristics of individuals is sentencing. Though
sentencing maxima and minima are normally defined in legislation, such definitions are
usually wonderfully wide and leave enormous room for judicial discretion. Whenever
discretion is present, personality has an opportunity to affect behavior. The impact of
judicial incentives on judicial sentencing behavior, of course, is of great interest. However,
I have not been able to collect data on sentencing in any systematic fashion (for reasons
stated later). Thus, I present my thought and impressions here to provoke further
research and discussion on the subject.
There are at least two modes of attacking the problem of sentencing. First, one might
pose to each respondent hypothetical cases, including detailed descriptions of defendants,
charges, and sentencing reports. Two problems assert themselves: (1) unless one matches
the hypotheticals with the actual content of the judge's caseload, results may be
misleading; (2) even if one can be assured that cases are representative, the fact that cases
are hypothetical - that no live defendant goes to jail or goes free - may tend to make
verdicts unreal. Second, one might probe the records of actual sentencing behavior. But,
once again, two problems assert themselves: (1) it is difficult to obtain access to
sentencing data (in my own explorations, I ran into the barrier of a resolute and
protective Administrative Office); (2) it is difficult - if not impossible - to match
offenses and offenders to produce comparable cases. Despite its inherent liabilities, I have
opted for the second approach. Because of official restrictions placed on me, however, my
explorations were tentative. Suffice it to say that the following discussion is the result
of examinations of files and observation of sentencing.
First of all, it is useful to set out hypotheses about the relationships between
judicial incentive and sentencing behavior. Trial judges who are motivated by a program
incentive should tend to mete out moderate sentences, varying the degree of harshness
in close measure to the gravity of the crime. Depending upon his ideological position,
the obligation judge should tend to give the defendant sentences that are either extremely
severe or extremely lenient. The status judge should confer overly stringent penalties on
convicts of lower socioeconomic status; conversely, he should dispense overly indulgent
sentences to convicts whose status is equivalent to or above his own. Judges with a game
incentive will tend to behave in a manner similar to the program judge, though they
will more likely than not take an even more pragmatic orientation in sentencing decisions
than will the program type.
My impressions comport nicely with the hypotheses: obligation and status judges are
the harshest sentencers and game judges are more moderate in sentencing decisions.
In a future paper I hope to present systematic data on the relationships between
judicial incentives and judicial sentencing behavior.
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